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Building the “State” without “Peace” or Making “Peace” without the “State” 
A Baseline Study on the Paradox of State-building and Peace-building in Sierra Leone 
Introduction 
Even for countries with every prospect of perpetual survival, periodic evaluation of how 
situations have been managed during moments of national emergencies is an 
appropriate exercise. This becomes all the more profound for nations that have had 
occasions to reshape the structures of their national constructs after situations of 
intense peace and security breakdowns that affected intergroup relations. This is where 
the mutually reinforcing subjects of “Peace-building” and State-building” come into the 
equation of national politics.1 What seems to be the crucial issue here is the nature and 
extent to which the management of the outbreak of conflict facilitates a society’s 
revisiting of the central issues in its statebuilding conversation. Addressing these issues 
allows for the location of peacebuilding as part of the continuum of statebuilding in 
which peacebuilding represents an interlude in the state-building process that has now 
turned violent. The peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone after its bitter civil war from 
1991-2002 provides a rich empirical basis for the examination of how the nation used 
the opportunity of its “ second-chance” to address fundamental issues of governance at 
the heart of its statebuilding conversation and therefore allows us to locate the 
mutuality between peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
 
This study takes a detailed look at the process of Peace-building and State-building in 
Sierra Leone after its bitter civil war. Among the crucial questions it raises include:  
 
1. What is Sierra Leone’s historical trajectory in relation to the statebuilding 
conversation that took place before the civil war?  
 
2. What was distinct about the process leading to the settlement? What are distinct 
features of the settlement and considerations that dictated the settlement?  
                                                 
1Both State-building and Peace-building continue to attract academic attention. Recent studies on both subjects 
include: Craig Zelizer, Integrated Peace-building: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict, 2013 and Timothy 







3. To what extent has the formal agreements reached after conflicts brought 
credible long-term peace? 
4. To what extent has peace-building returned the Sierra Leonean society to the 
original state-building “conversation” and how have fundamental issues of 
governance been addressed in the aftermath of the conflict?  
5. What identity issues that were part of the statebuilding conversation were taken 
into consideration in the settlement and post settlement arrangements? 
6.  Has the gender regimes that predated conflict altered? If so, how? Does this 
differ from other identity conversations pre- and post conflict?  
 
These questions, often previously asked rhetorically, are the subjects of focus of this 
research.2 The central argument advanced in the paper is that four issues are central to 
the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone. These are:  
 
i. The identity conversation in the quest for nationhood; 
ii. The search for a legitimate, and effective national political culture; 
iii. The politics (and intrigues) involved in the management of its natural resource 
endowments; and  
iv. The re-engagement of societies and communities at the margins of the state. 
 
This Baseline study also posits that efforts to address these four issues have underlined 
the state-building conversation in the country and that lasting peace will depend on the 
extent to which these issues are addressed 
 
This Baseline study attempts five objectives. First, it provides a historical perspective of 
the politics and intricacies of the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone. Second, it 
discusses the country’s civil conflict, especially the issues that underlined its causes and 
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 Among the countries that fall into this category are Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda and Ethiopia. All these countries 






prolongation. Third, it interrogates the process leading up to the settlement and the 
distinct features of the settlement, including the actors involved and the issues covered 
or neglected in the search for peace. Fourth, it examines the outcomes of the settlement 
including the extent of the transformation of the identity markers and extracts the 
lessons learnt from the peace process. Lastly the study identifies the key propositions to 
be tested during the proposed field-trip.  
 
The Inevitability Of Instability: Extracting Relevant Historical Trajectories In The 
Statebuilding Conversation In Sierra Leone 
 
As a former British colony established by freed slaves, Sierra Leone was, until the 
outbreak of its civil war in 1991, one of West Africa’s beacons of admiration.3 Its tertiary 
institution, the Fourah Bay College, had trained many of West Africa’s early elites,4 and 
the relatively stable nature of its democracy, even if not very credible, was sufficient to 
win it a measure of respect in a region with littered history of civil wars, military coups 
and acrimonious inter-group relations.5 However, within this historical evolution lay 
many issues that were to play redoubtable roles in some of the developments that now 
characterise the political and economic outlooks of the country. Not long after its 
independence in April 1961, clear indications began to emerge that the country would 
be bedevilled with instability, even if the scale of what ultimately came could not have 
been imagined. This “inevitability of instability” syndrome was rooted mainly in 1) the 
nature of ethnic relations; 2) the nature of political governance; 3) the management of 
natural resources; and 4) social exclusion. However these issues cannot be understood 
in isolation. In order to understand the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone it is 
therefore crucial to bear in mind the complexity, intertwinement of these issues and 
their mutually influencing nature. 
Identity Conversations and the Quest for Nationhood. 
 
                                                 
3The country’s beaches have historically attracted visitors to the country and the general peace that existed in 
theneighbouring countries for the period immediately after independence were sources of further attraction. 
4 Fourah Bay College was Black Africa’s first University College and its contribution to educational development of the 
region has recently been captured in the first major book on the University, See, Anthony Karim Kamara, A Concise 
History of Fourah Bay College 1827 – 2003,   








Identity conversations in Sierra Leone’s statebuilding process centre on the control and 
domination of the state and the political sphere by political elites. They involve the 
manipulation of the ethnic relations largely among the Krios, Mendes, Temnes and the 
Limbas for narrow political and elite interests. In the pre-colonial period, these identity 
conversations were initially and largely between the resettled slaves, the Krios and the 
indigenous local populations. The indigenous population of Sierra Leone is made up of 
some 18 ethnic groups. The south and eastern part of the country is dominated by the 
Mendes, which is the largest ethnic group in the country. Temnes, Limbas, Korankos, 
Yalunkas, Fullas and few others dominate the northern part of the country with the 
Krios in the western areas.6   
 
The British Colonial administration divided Sierra Leone into two entities: the Colony 
and the Protectorate. These territorial divisions resulted in the unequal development of 
the protectorate, mainly inhabited by the indigenous populations, in comparison to the 
Colony, largely populated by the Krios.7 These sociological and geo-political divisions 
resulted in the privileging by the British of the Krios over the indigenous populations 
and undermined the interdependence and cultural understanding between the two 
broad groups. As a consequence, the Krios were highly educated and occupied most of 
the professional positions in the colonial administrations at the expense of the 
indigenous populations broadly described as illiterate. This subsequently reinforced the 
air of superiority of the Krios over the indigenous populations. The Krios who were 
more educated and Christians felt that they had a mission to expose the ingenious 
populations to “ light’ and civilisation. The indigenous populations fiercely resisted 
these perceptions of cultural, religious and racial superiority. These racial and 
prejudicial distinctions however underlined and structured the legal, administrative, 
political and social relations between and within the colony and protectorate.8 The main 
underlying point of tension at the heart of this identity conversation was the 
contestation over political equality and control of the state.9 With increased political 
mobilization of the Krios against colonial rule, the British established legal policies that 
increased political and public participation of the Indigenous populations in the 
                                                 
6Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone. London, 1962. 
7 TRC Final Report, Chapter One p.5-6 
8 Jimmy D. Kandeh 1992 Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Apr. 
p.83 






governance process.10 Additionally, the British and the natives realigned their economic 
and trade relations with the Krios following the arrival of Lebanese immigrants in 
1907.11 This further widened the ethnic rift between the natives and the Krios. As 
independence approached, the contestations between the numerically larger native 
populations and the minority Krios centred on the control and domination of the post –
independent political project. Remnants of these divisions continue to reverberate 
throughout the post-independence period. 
 
Following independence, this identity conversation shifted to reflect political 
contestations predominantly among the Mendes, Temnes and the Limbas elites over the 
control of the state and its resources. This resulted in the instrumentalization of ethnic 
identities by the elites for their own narrow interests.12 As such, political organizations 
and divisions in the country were formed and historically and contemporaneously 
mirrored ethnic Identities.  The post independent political party, The Sierra Leone’s 
People Party, attracted support predominantly from the Mendes and was stigmatized as 
a Mende party.13 Conversely, the All Peoples Congress led by Siaka Stevens was formed 
as a counterforce to SLPP and the Mendes and drew its support principally from the 
Temnes, and the Limbas. Stevens’ dictatorship for instance ensured that his dominance, 
reinforced by ethnic favouritism in the security forces, continued until the transfer of 
power to Joseph Momoh in 1985. The preference for Momoh was predicated on the 
belief by Steven that only a loyal person from his own ethnic group (the Limba) could 
protect his interests while he was outside a formal position of political power. When the 
SLPP won office in 1996 for the first time in nearly 30 years, it was widely perceived as 
the return to power of the Mendes.14The dominance of northerners in the army 
remained a legacy from Stevens’ time. Hence, the military coup of May 1997 also 
reflected some shift in the ethnic complexion of power.  
 
The emergence and development of Ethno-political identities have played a significant 
political and developmental role through class formation and domination in the Sierra 
                                                 
10 TRC Report op-cit pp.9-10 
11 Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection. p.10 
12 REF? 
13 Jimmy D. Kandeh(1998).Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996.African Studies 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Sep.), p.92 






Leone statebuilding conversation.15 As will be shown later, after the conflict, ethnicity 
became more prominent in the understanding of national politics. For the purpose of 
our discussion in this project, what is crucial to note is that political elites have wired 
their interests to ethnicity and they have introduced zero-sum tendencies to national 
politics. All these were to be crucial factors in the politics of state and peace building 
due to the degree to which they have undermined the emergence and development of a 
collective sense of national identity. 
The Search for a legitimate and effective national political culture 
 
A central issue in the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone involves the nature and 
legitimacy of the political governance. An examination of the exercise of political 
governance in Sierra Leone reveals a distinctive narrative of elite centred governance at 
the expense of social transformation. This conversation among the elites is distinct in its 
exclusion of the Sierra Leone society in the negotiation of the terms in which they would 
be governed and its attendant degenerative social, political and economic impacts. The 
elites indifference to the larger societal demands was driven by political contestation 
over the consolidation of power and control of the state and its resources. Three main 
features of this elite centred sate building conversation are emblematic of the exclusion 
of the Sierra Leone Society in the governance process and found variant expressions 
before and after outbreak of the civil war this include repression, authoritarianism and 
brutality of the Political governance, corruption and the emergence of an alternative 
radical politics. 
 
Repression, brutality and authoritarianism as components of governance are 
emblematic of the Sierra Leonean Statebuilding conversation. The restructuring of the 
chieftaincy system in the protectorate16 by the British in their expansionist process 
marked the emergence of political repression and authoritarianism by indigenous 
political leaders in Sierra Leone.17 Before this, the chiefs were legitimately elected and 
responsive to their people and were subjected to inbuilt traditional systems of check 
and balances that prevented them from becoming abusive or autocratic.18 The 
                                                 
15 Jimmy D. Kandeh (1992.)pp. 81-99 April 
16 The system of chieftaincy was non existent in the Colony  







consolidation of colonial rule resulted in the erosion of these values and remaking of the 
chieftaincy system into institutions for forced and brutal taxation and punishments. 
Additionally the subservience of the chiefs to the colonial authority, their perceived lack 
of fairness and injustice and corruptible nature further alienated them from the local 
populations.19 This legacy was carried over into the post independent period and 
resulted in the co-option of chiefs by the political elites.  
 
With independence, the politico-elites were ruthless in how they responded to dissent 
both within the opposition and within their regimes. From 1960, divisive party politics 
largely between the SLLP and APC grounded on ethnic and regional alliances and weak 
support bases fragmented the political system in Sierra Leone and with it hopes of a 
collective national identity. Political mobilization centred on the construction of a 
multiparty system and a democratic culture. The political dissent by a broad constituent 
of Sierra Leoneans immediately precipitated the replacement of Sir Milton Magai, 
following his death, by his Sir Albert Magai. The issue at this point was the qualifications 
of Sir Albert Magai. Against the background of the oppositions against him, Sir Albert 
Magai attempted to establish a one party rule. This was widely opposed and resulted in 
the uncovering of a coup plot against him.20 Magai desire to consolidate power further 
entrenched regional and ethnic polarization, cronyism in the public sphere and the 
narrowing of the political space. 
 
Albert Magai’s loss of election in 1967 to Siaka Stevens precipitated three military coups 
within the space of one-year.21 Once he assumed office, Steven began the process of 
arrogating more powers to himself, a process that resulted in the establishment of a 
one-party-state in 1978. A key feature and development of the Steven administration 
was the way he dealt with opposition and the consequences this was to have on the 
country’s future. While the Magai brothers were somewhat tolerant of opposition, with 
Sir Milton Magai even providing money for opposition political parties to organise 
                                                 
19 TRC Final Report, pp.11-12 
20 In response to the coup, Sir Albert Magai signed a Defence Pact with Guinea, thus providing a prelude to the 
complex regional involvement that was later to occur in the country. He ruled until 1967, when he lost election to 
Siaka Steven’s All People’s Congress (APC). 
21 The first, led by David Lansana, a Brigadier in the army and a close friend of Albert Magai, who overthrew Stevens 
few hours after assuming office in April 1967. Another coup led by Andrew Juxton-Smith later removed Lansana in 
March 1968. This regime too was overthrown the following month by Brigadier John Bangura, who reinstated the 







campaigns, Steven was ruthless in the ways he responded to dissent. For example, in 
May 1971, a coup attempt by John Bangura, who had earlier handed power to him was 
uncovered at conception and Bangura and other plotters were hanged.22 To convince 
Sierra Leoneans that the plotters had been killed, their bodies were displaced for public 
view. The killing of Bangura marked the beginning of an unfortunate sequence that was 
to plague Sierra Leone. From that moment, bloodshed became a part of Sierra Leonean 
politics and governance. Countrywide student demonstrations in 1977 against the 
corrupt, and repressive APC regime marked the first attempt at political mobilization 
against the regime.23 The APC however responded ruthlessly by closing all schools and 
colleges, arrest and detained scores of students and dissolved the one-party 
legislature.24 The introduction of the one-party constitution in 1978 under the APC 
narrowed the political space and unmasked ethnic and electoral violence.25  
 
 In 1986, Stevens retired from politics and specifically chose Joseph Momoh, who had 
previously been the head of the Sierra Leone Army, to be his successor. There was no 
major shift in policy towards governance under Momoh. Like Stevens, he too took 
strong views against coup plot and, in fact, had his Vice President, Francis Minah, 
hanged in 1989 for one of such alleged coups. Abuse of power continued under Momoh 
and it was not surprising that it was under him that a civil war that was to redefine the 
outlook of Sierra Leone occurred. As the 1996 elections demonstrated, the change of 
government did not lead to the transformation of institutional practices of 
government.26All these political contestations and associated repressions and 
brutalities created a reduction in the value of human life among Sierra Leoneans, a 
trend that was to be displayed to its most abysmal level during the civil war. 
 
Military coups are crucial parts in the historical evolution of the Sierra Leone state. 
Military coups unmasked political contestations among the elites and had redoubtable 
impacts in the statebuilding conversation. In March 1971 another military coup was 
organized by soldiers loyal to Bangura. One of those arrested and jailed for this coup 
                                                 
22 This was in spite of the impassioned speech in which Bangura recalled his long association with Stevens and the 
assistance he gave in ensuring that Stevens became the Prime Minister. 
23 Jimmy D. Kandeh(1998). pp. 91-111 
24Ibid.,p. 93 
25Ibid., p. 93 






was Foday Sankoh, a name that was to become the most infamous in the history of 
Sierra Leone as the head of the Revolutionary United Forces. In fact this turn of events 
posits the potential impact of discontent with the political elite by excluded groups. It 
also impacts on the statebuilding process as Sankoh sought to reengage this in some 
way through the civil war. From here the links between political governance and the 
antecedents of violent conflict are well established. There was another alleged plot in 
July 1974, which saw 8 people executed.  The 1997 AFRC/RUF coup signalled the failure 
of democratic renewal in Sierra Leone and the delinking of democracy and 
development.27These contestations of power among the various leaders had 
considerable impact on statebuilding in at least two ways. First, it created an impression 
that later became entrenched in the country that control of political power at the centre 
was to be aspired for with desperation and that holders of political power at the centre 
can use the control of state resources to intimidate the population. Second, it marked 
the beginning of the marginalisation of segments of the society, especially youths and 
minority ethnic groups. 
 
However, far more prominent in explaining the rots that subsequently led to the civil 
war was the nature and extent of corruption in the country.28 The governments, 
especially the Steven’s, was notoriously corrupt and it made use extensive patronage 
that effectively undermined all the principal institutions including the parliament, 
police, armed forces and civil service. Similar to the APC, and NPRC,the SLLP under 
Tejan Kabbah remained a unregenerate patronage party which devoured that state.29 
The perceptions of a hegemonic ethnic group in the APC additionally coloured any 
vestiges of a national identity and contributed to the introduction of nepotism and 
cronyism in state institutions.30 Even at this early stage, the management of the 
country’s mineral resources, especially diamonds, had become a key issue and it was 
the mismanagement and general problems of governance that was to lead to the bitter 
civil war.31 
 
                                                 
27Ibid., p. 107-109 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid.p. 107 
30 TRC Report p,20 
31 See, Abiodun Alao: Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment: Rochester: University of 






The above elite governance process and its associated brutality and repression laid the 
foundations for the emergence of a radical political alternative. Historically however 
political mobilization can be traced backed to the emergence of trade and labour unions. 
This sowed the seeds for student radicalism and for the emergence of RUF. However, 
the political dissent was distinct in its absence of a political consciousness and a 
programme of action. This was conspicuously absent within the RUF/SL 
Natural Resource Management and the Politics of State-building and Peace-
building in Sierra Leone 
 
There is a popular anecdote among Sierra Leoneans that effectively captures the 
relationship between natural resource endowments and the politics of their 
management in the country. According to the anecdote: 
   
“When at creation God blessed Sierra Leone with enormous mineral resources, other 
nations of the world complained at the favourable disposition of God towards the 
country. In response, God told them: “Wait till you see their leaders”. 
 
By regional standards, Sierra Leone’s natural resources are significant, if not 
exceptional. Apart from its land that is fertile for agriculture, the country also has 
considerable mineral resources, such as Gold, Diamond, Bauxite, Rutile, and Iron Ore 
and has the third largest mining deposit in the world and the largest in Africa. Of all 
these, however, diamonds are the most important, and consequently, most 
controversial. The resource was discovered in Sierra Leone in 1938, and since then, it 
has dominated the country’s economy, accounting for virtually all of Sierra Leone’s 
foreign exchange earnings.32 The deposits are located in three main fields: Koidu-
Yengema (Kono), Tongo and Zimmi. These run south of Zimmi town along the Mano 
River down to the Liberian border. The deposits are shallow and require minimal 
exploitation to guarantee returns. The location as a gateway to war-torn Liberia also 
made it strategic during Liberia’s conflict. The same applies to gold, which, after its 
discovery immediately contributed to the country’s national economy. But apart from 
                                                 
32 The country’s diamond deposit is the highly prized Kimberlite dyke concessions (underground rock-formation 
deposits) and they are commonly the alluvial variety (water-borne deposits of gravel). Sierra Leone at the 
Crossroads: Seizing the chance to benefit from mining. Published by National Advocacy Coalition On Extractives 







gold and diamonds, there is iron ore at Marampa and it was a major foreign-exchange 
earner until mining there was closed down in the mid-1990s.33 In terms of the economic 
benefits accruable from these resources, its relatively small population of about 5 
million people should ordinarily have advantaged Sierra Leone. However, the failure to 
manage these resources efficiently brings the issue of natural resource governance into 
focus of attention. Indeed, as will be discussed later, it is the mismanagement of these 
resources that brought diamonds to the focus of attention in the country’s civil war. 
 
As with most African countries, the central government manages Sierra Leone’s mineral 
resources. In the case of Sierra Leone, the government was completely irresponsible 
and irresponsive in the way the management was done. Although structures were 
established to manage the resources these were again undermined by the government 
in what looked like self-inflicted sabotage. These further weakened the state. The first 
attempt to ensure the participation of Sierra Leoneans in the management of diamonds 
extraction in the country was the establishment in 1976 of the Alluvial Diamonds 
Mining Scheme (ADMS). Although ostensibly this was to ensure the participation of all 
Sierra Leoneans in the management, the interest of the resource producing 
communities was to be at the fore of attention however, was not to be the case, as the 
introduction of the ADMS later became an opportunity for foreigners, especially 
Lebanese to become more deeply involved in the affairs of the diamonds business. As a 
way of going round the activities of the ADMS, many fictitious companies were set up by 
Sierra Leonean elites and the Lebanese. Consequently, despite the official attempt by 
the government to ensure the participation of people from the diamonds-producing 
communities, to these people, diamonds mining was an activity undertaken by 
“strangers”, either “racial” or “ethnic”. The controversies of resource control were 
further made more difficult by break-down in traditional authority and the blurring of 
ethnic identities of the migrant workers who worked in the diamonds fields. In essence 
the decentralization and privatization of extraction was expected to assist the 
redistribution of the proceeds among a broader base of Sierra Leoneans. However the 
success of this ‘broadening’ attempt was limited on account of a poor base for 
involvement on the part of the domestic private sector at the local level due to a history 
of exclusion on various levels, including access to basic social and physical 
                                                 






infrastructure as is highlighted later in the section. Rather it undermined inadvertently 
the control and power of the state as a construct to manage the mineral resource sector. 
It also fuelled challenges to the monopoly of the state, not least over the use of force. 
Arguably it impacted on the state-building process as access to these resources 
represented stronger voices in power negotiation as evidenced by the main group 
during the civil war, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 
 
In 1985, the government established the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), 
the primary responsibility of which was to collect revenue.34 But while in theory this 
institution existed, most of Sierra Leone’s diamond and gold were still smuggled out of 
the country. All across the country, artisan miners smuggle diamonds out of the country 
and the significant role that some of the neighbouring countries were later to play in the 
affairs of diamond mining and illegal exploitation began during this period. 
 
Contrary to what is often assumed natural resources have been at the roots of 
controversies before the outbreak of the war in 1991. Indeed, what actually happened 
during the war was that a particular natural resource, diamonds, gained prominence in 
the politics of the conflict in the West African nation. While not underestimating the 
importance of diamonds in the war in Sierra Leone, especially its introduction of 
multiplicity of actors and brutality into the conflict, the recognition diamonds also 
attained during the war was because of other on-going wars where the resource was 
playing important roles, as in the cases of Angola and the DRC. 
 
In looking at how mineral resources underlined state-building and peace-building, five 
features of the mineral resource governance sector needs to be identified, even if not 
discussed in any significant details. The first was the role of the level of corruption and 
elite greed, which permeated all facets of the sector. It was a well-known fact that 
successive governments have illegally used resources from diamonds for personal 
enrichment. As would be discussed later, this was to be a major cause in the civil war.  
 
The second was the role of the Lebanese. Indeed, the Lebanese are widely believed to be 
at the centre of many questionable activities in diamonds and gold exploitation in the 
                                                 






country. According to the authoritative Partnership Africa Canada, “from the late 1970s 
to the early 1990s, aspects of Lebanon's civil war were played out in miniature in Sierra 
Leone, [as] various Lebanese militia sought financial assistance from their compatriots 
in Sierra Leone, and the country's diamonds became an important informal tax base for 
one faction or the other” Indeed, the link between Lebanese business interest and the 
trade in diamond during the war was to become a major factor in explaining the 
prolongation of the war. It has also been noted by scholars that Sierra Leone diamonds 
were used to finance part of the civil war in Lebanon. 35 Over the years, they have also 
developed complex networks of relationship with successive government functionaries 
at the expense of the state.  
 
Third, were the activities of the “illicit” miners; it is impossible to know the exact 
number of those who were undertaking this activity before the beginning of the war but 
a figure going into several thousand will not be an exaggeration. These people who 
came from all over the world were illegally exploiting the resources at the expense of 
the local population.  Thus, the people of the diamonds producing region were victims of 
both the official government exploitation and those of the illicit miners. However, of 
these two actors, the local population felt more comfortable with the illicit miners 
because they were paid some money for the diamonds they were able to get.  
 
The fourth consideration was the use of the security agencies to monitor the activities in 
the diamonds producing regions. Right from the time of independence, the government 
had used the security forces to impose “order” in the diamonds regions. For example, 
the government of Sir Albert Magai used police and the army. During the period of 
President Siaka Stevens, the repression became more profound as the government, 
allegedly through the introduction of Lebanese business men like Jamil Said 
Mohammed, hired Palestinian fighters to protect diamond fields. Indeed, by the early 
1980s, many diamond dealers had transformed their tributors into armed personal 
bodyguards. The implication of these was that the only official government presence in 
the diamonds producing region of Sierra Leone was the security and this was mainly to 
suppress the population.  
                                                 








Fifth and most profound of all was neglect of the diamond-producing region of the 
country. It was a well-known fact that the diamond producing parts of Sierra Leone are 
the least developed, with no electricity, pipe-borne water. Indeed, the region has 
nothing to show for producing the resource that is the life-wire of national economy.36 
This was to be a crucial reason for the bitter civil war. 
Re-engaging the “margins” 
 
The Statebuilding conversation in Sierra has also centred on negotiations on the 
inclusion of communities and societies excluded from these conversations. The 
concentration of political power, economic activities and social amenities in the centre 
to the neglect of the rest for the country produced a distinctive narrative of exclusion. 
This narrative of exclusion found variant forms of expression before and during the civil 
war. The RUF for instance exploited the narratives of youth marginalization and the 
neglect of the rural communities to recruit child soldiers and propagate their 
propaganda. In order to understand this conversation of re-engaging the margins it is 
important to analyse historically the emergence of social exclusion in Sierra Leone by 
looking at the marginalization of the youth and the neglect of rural populations and the 
resource producing areas.  
 
The ethno-regional dynamics of the Civil war can be traced back to the historical neglect 
of regional areas peripheral to the development of the Sierra Leonean State. The neglect 
of the rural community had many manifestations. For example, access to safe water and 
sanitation in urban areas in 1990 was 83 per cent and 59 per cent respectively, 
compared to 22 per cent and 35 per cent for rural areas.37 But while there was a general 
neglect of rural areas, the country’s south-east province- Kano district, which is the 
main diamond producing region, suffered neglect from successive governments, such 
that the people in the region had little to show for being the residents of the resource-
rich land that is the main stay of the national economy. Pujehun district for instance was 
emblematic of a volatile chieftaincy system, high literacy and lack of social amenities 
that sow the seeds for resistance and rebellions. Tonkolil, Bo and Moyamba, Kailahun 
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district was replete with political and social disillusionment, lack of basic infrastructure 
and remoteness from the political centre.38 Kambia district was characteristic of 
geographical isolation and the associated poverty and illiteracy, abusive and absolute 
stranglehold by the chief that created a sense of hopelessness. It was thus not surprising 
that these regions were to be the starting point of the rebellion, as there had been a 
disenchanted operation base that could be exploited for violent anti-government 
operations. The socio-economic and political conditions in these geographically isolated 
regions provided the basis for re-engagement with the socially indifferent political 
centre. However this conversation found violent expressions following the outbreak of 
the civil war.  
 
The Civil War 
 
The Sierra Leone civil war (1991 – 2002) was undoubtedly the most important 
landmarks in the history of the country. It is also a topic that has attracted its own range 
of academic attention.39  The war started when the Revolutionary United Front, (RUF), a 
hitherto unknown movement took up arms against the government of President 
Momoh. The force was led by Foday Sankho, a former army photographer who deserted 
the army after having been court-marshalled for involvement in a coup against Siaka 
Stevens. The causes of the war are diverse, but they centred around four main factors: 
(i) the mismanagement of the country’s natural resources; (ii) the absence of credible 
democracy; (iii) the total neglect of the rural community; and (iv) the contagious effects 
of the war in neighbouring Liberia.  
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Three characteristics of the war are worthy of note because of their contributions in 
shaping the future of Sierra Leone. These are: the extent of the brutality; the diversity of 
the actors that participated; the role of diamonds; and the nature of the final cessation 
of the conflict. The brutality that manifested in the war was severe and at a stage, the 
RUF became one of the world’s most brutal insurgent movements. On the whole, about 
50,000 people died and up to half a million people displaced. Again, in what became its 
most gruesome signature, the war produced up to 4,000 amputees – including babies as 
young as three months. It was this brutality that brought the war to the focus of 
international attention. 
 
On its part, the diversity of actors was a factor that made the war potentially confusing, 
with ephemeral alliances changing the tides of battle fortunes. It also made the peace 
process more complicated. At the beginning, it was between the rebel force and the 
government forces, then loyal to the late President Joseph Mommoh. A civil militia 
group, known as the Kamajors later came into the equation, joining forces with the 
government against the rebel RUF. In April 1992, another coup sent Momoh into exile 
and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC proved 
equally ineffective in dealing with the RUF and by 1995 the RUF controlled most of the 
countryside and had arrived at the outskirts of Freetown. To try to retrieve the 
situation, the NPRC hired several hundred mercenaries from the firm Executive 
Outcomes. To all these various actors were to be added the (Sobel) a sobriquet for those 
who operate both as rebel and soldier. 
 
The third aspect of the war with long-term implication was the link with diamonds. 
Indeed the war attained notoriety because of the desperate desire of all the warring 
sides to have access to diamonds. This was also to explain the multiplicity of external 
actors that came into the politics of the civil war. The important role of diamonds in 
explaining the external ramifications of the conflict is evident in the subsequent 
conviction of former President Charles Taylor of involvement in the Sierra Leone civil 








Responding To The Conflict: Distinct Features Of The Pre Settlement And 
Settlement Processes.  
 
The efforts to end the war in Sierra Leone began almost as soon as it started. However, 
the various truncations it experienced meant that the impacts were often not noticeable. 
As in all cases, the initial effort was to end the war and create a crude semblance of 
order around which post-conflict reconstructions can commence. The peace process in 
Sierra Leone was characterised by a number of events with their associated distinctive 
features, which had an impact in the prolongation of the conflict, and defined the 
complexity peacebuilding process and the degree to which it laid basis for lasting peace. 
The multiplicity, and shifting alliances of the main protagonists 
 
The process of bringing peace to Sierra Leone was quite complex for at least two 
reasons. First, there were some actors whose position was not formally recognised for a 
very long time, even though they were widely recognised as being dominant actors in 
the conflict. Perhaps the best example here was Charles Taylor, who, because of his role 
then as a Warlord, could not have been formally invited to come into the negotiation 
table in some of the early discussions. Consequently, his non-involvement in the process 
meant that he was not even legally liable to any violation accusation. This was to be a 
major factor in the prolongation of the conflict. 
 
Second, the patterns of alliances were constantly shifting and the main actors were 
multiplying accordingly. There were militia groups, mercenaries, rebels, and 
government soldiers all shifting and re-juggling alliances; at a stage the rebels and the 
soldiers fought alongside each other against the regional force. In circumstances of this 
nature, the extent to which enduring peacebuilding could be quickly implemented is 
severely limited.  








To a very large extent, those who intervened to bring peace and restore the statehood of 
Sierra Leone were dictated by circumstances. With actors already involved in 
neighbouring Liberia, those who went into Sierra Leone were those somewhat 
“seconded” from Liberia and these were the regional organisation, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations. While the 
intentions of both were the same, the extent of motivation differed. For ECOWAS, the 
location of the country ruled out indifference as an option to the organisation, while the 
United Nations felt that another state collapse after Liberia would destabilise the entire 
Sub-region. Second, the regional organisation that was determined to bring peace to the 
country, ECOWAS, was again not operating as a united front. Indeed, one of the 
countries, Cote d’Ivoire was known to be a sympathiser of the rebel force in the country. 
Other lesser interveners that intervened, albeit on a lesser scale, were UK, the African 
Union and hired mercenaries.  Notwithstanding the prominence of these actors, Sierra 
Leone was not without an organized civil society, which had clarity about the causes of 
the war and a preferred path to stable peace. 
“Flawed” Peace Agreements: Abidjan, Conakry, and Lome Agreements  
 
Three main Agreements were signed to end the Sierra Leone Civil War. The first was the 
Abidjan Peace Agreement, signed between the government of President Kabbah and the 
RUF in November 1996 and terminated following the May 1997 coup. The second was 
the Conakry Agreement, signed in October 1997, between the military Junta of Johnny 
Paul Koroma and ECOWAS. This agreement was terminated when ECOMOG removed 
the AFRC Junta from power before the due date stipulated in the agreement. This was 
later followed by the Lome Peace Agreement, signed in July 1999 between President 
Kabbah and the RUF and remained among the most controversial agreements ever 
signed in the sub-region.40  
A common feature that underlined the design of these three agreements was the extent 
to which the agreements sought to appease the main protagonist and therefore end the 
                                                 
40 President Kabbah did not want to sign any further agreement with the RUF, but domestic and external pressure 
forced him to capitulate. Domestically, the rebels controlled the controlled the main diamond mines, which meant 
that some form of agreement had to be reached. External pressures came from Britain and Nigeria. Britain needed a 
face-saving agreement after the controversial Sandline Affairs. Sandline Affair, which saw the British Labour 
government, accused of contravening a UN arms embargo by allowing a private military company to supply arms to 
the Sierra Leone government and ECOMOG forces. Nigeria on the other hand was finding the human and financial 







conflict at the expense of addressing the structural causes of the conflict that lay at the 
statebuilding conversation. Tied to this was the erroneous assumption regarding the 
willingness and commitment of the RUF and the capacity of the government of 
President of Kabbah to building lasting peace.41   
The Abidjan Agreement granted a general amnesty to RUF in return for the rebels 
ending their activities. The main aim of the Conakry Agreement was to allow for the 
return of the overthrown government of President Kabbah within six months. This 
baseline study however focuses on the Lome Agreement was as it was central to the 
peace process for it provided for the entry of the largely externally driven peacebuilding 
process. 
The Lome Agreement was emblematic of a number of omissions and concessions that 
undermined the sustainability of the peace process. The Lome Agreement granted 
significant and controversial concessions. The agreement legitimized the RUF and its 
brutal actions by   granting the rebel group public offices.42 Article V especially 
dismayed Sierra Leoneans, for it specifically allocated Cabinet appointments to 
members of the rebel force43 Articles III to IV also allowed for power sharing with the 
government through the transformation of RUF into a political party and the formation 
of a broad based government of national unity. This provisions belied RUF commitment 
to peace. 
Furthermore, the Agreement ensured the disarming of the RUF by controversially and 
erroneously pardoning Foday Sonkah for treason and granting him the position of Vice 
President and chairman of the commission that oversaw Sierra Leone’s diamond mines 
and therefore unreserved control of Sierra Leone’s strategic natural resources.44 By 
giving Foday Sanko the position of vice president, the agreement made Sankoh 
answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone. The Lome Agreement as such is also 
distinct and infamous in the extent to which it individualized the peace agreement 
around the person of Foday Sankoh. This and the lack of a credible sanction regime to 
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43 Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero Op-cit p.123 
44 See Article VIII of the Lome Peace Agreement For more discussion on the Lome Peace Agreement, see, Abiodun 
Alao and Comfort Ero: “Cut Short for Taking Shortcuts: The Lome Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone”, Journal of Civil 






deal with non-compliance with the agreements gave Foday Sonkah and the Rebel group 
room to manoeuvre and therefore opportunity to delay the peace process.45  
 
Additionally, the agreement excluded key actors in the conflict including local militias, 
Karamajors, and remnants of SLA from the negotiation and implementation of the 
agreement.46Article XI of the agreement also controversially granted RUF 'absolute and 
free pardon ... in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to 
the time of the signing of the Lome agreement47 and as a result it denied justice to the 
victims of RUF atrocities.48 This blanket amnesty resulted in internal and external 
backlash against the UN and other external parties to the negotiation. The accord 
however provided for the establishment of a TRC, while reneging of the agreement by 
RUF following the events of May 2000 forced the UN to rethink the amnesty offer 
therefore allowing for the set up a special court.49 The contradictions and defects within 
the Lome agreement allowed for the compromise of the position of Sierra Leone and 
demonstrated the limits and dangers of externally imposed peace at the expense of 
building a sustaining peace process. 
Uncoordinated International Response  
 
The international response to the conflict in Sierra Leone represents a model of 
disengagement. The international community’s indifference to the unfolding crisis in 
Sierra Leone was due to the fact that Sierra Leone represented minimal economic and 
strategic importance to the West.50 Indeed, the initial experience of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) instructively demonstrates the 
inadequate and uncoordinated international response to the civil war. UNAMSIL would 
however later become a model UN Mission.51 
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The operationalization of the Lome Agreement allowed for the departure of ECOMOG 
and the entry of a United Nations Team to supervise the ceasefire, disarmament and 
demobilisation plans. However, faced with low troop numbers, a weakened mandate 
and conflicting contingents, UNAMSIL’s 500 peacekeepers in May 2000 would find 
themselves hostage to the obstinate RUF rebels. This eventually led to the collapse of 
the Lome agreement.  
 
The May 2000 events demonstrated the lack of contingency planning on the part of the 
Force, the overreliance and erroneous assumption that the peace agreement would 
work and the single-minded focus on the demobilisation and disarmament tasks.52 
Additionally, the uncoordinated and inadequate deployment of 6000 troops to 
UNAMSIL reflected the unwillingness of the UN member states to offer any logistical 
and technical support to UNAMSIL.53 This apathy sums up the UN’s reluctance and 
inaction to respond decisively throughout the civil war until the events of May 2000.  
To further compound UNAMSIL’s problems, the UK intervention aimed at evacuation of 
British and European nationals was merely a show-off of UK military might rather than 
a genuine attempt to reinforce UNAMSIL.54 These “ over-the-horizon” displays and 
British unwillingness to commit troops under UN auspices heavily dented UN’s already 
tarnished image, challenged the mission’s raison d’etre and explicitly demonstrated the 
lack of faith in the UN. 
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argues that 'Sierra Leone showed that the political and 
operational lessons from failed UN missions in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia had not 
been learned”.55 UNAMSIL’s initial experience highlighted the mismatch between 
mission mandates and the lack of resources and support from UN member states of the 
UNSC that continued to plaque UN peacekeeping operations. As the Brahimi report 
articulated UNAMSIL represents the problems of international peacekeeping including 
lack of greater cohesion and direction, better rules of engagement, resources, well-
structured command and control, adequate equipment and political will and support 
from UN member states.56 
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Revisiting The Statebuilding Conversation: The Nature Of The Post Settlement 
Process 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Justice Commission and Special Court 
 
A key feature of the external post-conflict peacebuilding programme in Sierra Leone 
was the promotion of transitional justice through national reconciliation and healing 
and the prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Leonean law committed since November 30 1996. These two 
agendas were enshrined in the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) and the Special Court respectively and are by products of the Lome Agreement. 
 
Notwithstanding the funding and operational challenges that marred the two 
processes57, there were questions regarding the extent to which both institutions 
achieved their main objectives and therefore set Sierra Leone back to its statebuilding 
conversations. A major criticism relates to the tensions regarding the overlapping 
mandates of the two institutions. In particular, the work of the Special Court was 
undermined by the reluctance by perpetrators to the conflict to appear before the TRC 
for fear that their testimonies would be used against them in the Special court.58 Second, 
the confidence of the special court among Sierra Leoneans was undermined by the 
failure of the court to try perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for the war. 
With the exception of the trial of Charles Taylor, Issa Sessay and others, the death of key 
perpetrators of the war without trial including Foday Sankoh, Sam Hinga Norman, Sam 
Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma undermined the mission of the Special Court. Third, 
by seeking to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility the court failed to 
prosecute the actual perpetrators of the atrocities who carried out the orders of their 
commanders. On the contrarily, the foot solders were integrated in the national armed 
forces. The Final Report of the TRC also highlighted the lack of focus on the plight of the 
victims noting that meaningful truth telling cannot occur without adequate reparations 
for victims of conflict.59 
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Furthermore, the mandated timelines for the two institutions further raise questions 
regarding the extent to which the two processes revisited the historical statebuilding 
conversation that lay at the roots of the conflict. The Special court was only mandated to 
deal with atrocities committed after 30 November 1996.  This however fails to capture 
most of the atrocities that were committed before this date. Additionally, section 6 of 
the TRC Act of 2000 tasked the commission with the objective of creating a historical 
record of the violations of human rights from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 until 
the signing of the Lome Peace agreement.60 These timelines again cut off the historical 
period in the Sierra Leone Statebuilding conversation. Furthermore, legislation for the 
establishment of the TRC provided for a 12-month operational phase. These limited 
time mandates pale in comparison to the historical period in the statebuilding 
conversation and therefore puts in doubt the meaningfulness and efficacy of the 
national reconciliation and rebuilding process.  
 
 International institutional capacity building approach. 
 
The post conflict international statebuilding process in Sierra Leone thus followed the 
tried and tested post conflict institutional reconstruction model. This approach largely 
focused on rebuilding of state institutional capacity including the reconstruction of 
courts, prison and police buildings. This institutional statebuilding approach in Sierra 
Leone with it emphasis on institutional efficiency and technocratic support, 
microeconomic stability and consolidation of state authority is articulated in the Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) of June 2001 and Sierra Leone National 
Recovery Strategy of 2002.61 However as Christof Kurz argues, donor driven analytical 
and policy prescriptions influenced by neoclassical economics ideas with their focus on 
individual decision-making and functionalist formal institutions ignore the historical 
and sociological process in the Sierra Leone state formation process and elsewhere.62  
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Though his diagnosis of the flawed assumptions inherent in international peace and 
statebuilding processes are correct his alternative analytical framework of 
understanding the state formation process in Sierra through clientelism also fails to 




This section of the Baseline study addresses three main issues: how has inter-group 
relations been since the end of the civil war: how has the management of natural 
resources been since the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement that ended the war; and 
how the country fared on the crucial issue of corruption.  These three issues have been 
selected because they are the main issues that accounted for the war and also were the 
fundamental issues that the peace agreement attempted to address to prevent recourse 
to war. Since Sierra Leone has not returned to conflict since the signing of the 
agreement in 2002 (thus breaking a decade possibility of relapse rule) there is the need 
to investigate whether the agreement was effectively well packaged to address all 
aspects of the war or whether there were other factors that prevented a relapse.  
 
Continuation of divisive party politics along ethnic lines. 
 
The electoral contestation during the November 2012 elections largely between Enerst 
Koroma of the APC and Maada Bio of the SLPP re-invoked old rivalry between the two 
political parties and has further underline the role of ethnicity in national politics with 
the Mendes supporting the SLPP and Temnes supporting Koroma. Ethnic and sectional 
fault lines have also galvanized post election tension and violence. The fiercely 
contested 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections that brought the opposition 
APC party to power left the country deeply divided along ethnic and regional lines that 
have the potential to ignite violence upon the slightest provocation and plunge the 
country once more into chaos. The same could be said of the July 2008 Local 
government elections. In 2011, political violence first erupted on the national level in 
July when APC supporters allegedly attacked the SLPP nominee and flag bearer, 







Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. In the ensuing violence, one person was reported killed and 
20 people suffered injuries. Several buildings were also burnt down, including the local 
APC party office. The incumbent President Koroma won the election and the impact of 
ethnicity on politics has continued ever since.  
Natural Resource Governance 
 
Since the end of the war, efforts to manage natural resources have been relatively 
impressive, both because the country needed the money coming from these resources 
and also because of the realisation that any mismanagement could return back to a 
bitter conflict. In an attempt to appease the diamonds producing region of the country 
and also address international condemnation that was coming to the country because of 
its treatment of the diamond regions, the government later came up with a scheme 
whereby a percentage of the resources coming from diamonds is used to develop the 
local community. This initiative was, however, believed to have come too late and it was 
also considered as being too little. Diamonds have also played an important role in 
Sierra Leone's post war recovery. The coming into place of the Kimberley Process, the 
international regulatory mechanism that was established to monitor international 
trading in illegal diamonds, also assisted in ensuring that diamonds in Sierra Leone was 
quick to make a reverse from the negative image it had established during the period of 
the war. 
 
With the increase in diamond production and the end of the war, it then became 
possible for the government to divert more resources to post-war recovery. However, 
although increase in diamond revenue has assisted the government, it is also important 
to point out that the extent of destruction was too much for what this can address and 
as such the bulk of the money used for post-war reconstruction have been through 
donor funding. One aspect of post-war recovery's link with diamonds is the gradual 
increase that seems to be emerging in the social responsibility of some of the foreign 
diamond businessmen in the country. In some of the diamond producing regions of the 
country, Lebanese businessmen and local -population are coming together to discuss 
issues of common concerns, including the provision of security. Although this has not 
gone round all the regions, it is an initiative that seems to be attracting the interests of 







Sierra Leone natural resources base is also growing with exploration of mining, marine 
and oil resources. Like many other natural resources, the government is also making 
plans to come up with a major policy position on the management of marine resources. 
There are however concerns with the illegal exploitation of these marines resources by 
foreign vessels and their management.63 Sierra Leone's economy is now about to be 
turned around significantly with the discovery of oil.64 In 2009, the President 
established a Task Force to develop a new Petroleum Policy. The draft policy reflects 
concerns regarding good governance and prudent economic management of oil 
revenues for current and future generations. There can, however, be no doubt that the 
success will depend on the commitment and capacity to translate policy into action. The 
government is also trying to set up a National Oil Company. Also since the 
announcement of the find, a number of donors and NGOs have been involved in 
Petroleum governance and policy reform. One of the most prominent concerns of 
stakeholders is that oil might make Sierra Leone to fall victim of what has been 
described as "The oil-tragedy".  
Corruption and Management 
 
Corruption has reduced considerably, even though it is still a major issue in Sierra 
Leone. The presidency of the late Tejan Kabbah was marred with allegations of 
corruption against top government officials, although none was proven and nobody was 
convicted. The current President Koroma also has allegations of corruption on his neck. 
Although the President is widely considered to be above board on the issue of 
corruption (he was, in fact the first President to declare his assets) he is surrounded by 
people believed by people believed to be more controversial on issue of corruption. 
                                                 
63 Presently there are over 100 licensed vessels and more than half that number poaching. This is as a result of 
the fact that Sierra Leone had constantly been unable to supply the resources/logistics to protect its 
marine resources from unlicensed fishing, resulting in an over exploitation, lack of benefits to the country 
and an overall damaging effect to the resources eco-system. This has seen a number of attacks on local 
fishermen and the destruction of their fishing equipment. In some instances, the attacks have led to deaths and 
capture of citizens from neighbouring countries especially Guinea. There are, however, growing concerns now 
about the management of marine resources and in August 2012, there was a major protest by irate fishing 
mongers about the government's policies which they claimed was preventing them from having access to 
quality fish. 
64In September 2009, the United States independent oil firm, Anadarko, announced the discovery of a 
hydrocarbon system off the Sierra Leonean coast. The company operates the Venus B-1 exploration well in its 







Some of the corruption issues have been to the top of government and President 
Koromoa’s Vice President, Samuel Sumana, faced a major allegation of corruption over 




Among others, this Baseline study has the following Propositions: 
 
(1) That after a bitter civil conflict, enduring peace and stability can only come 
after key issues that underlined the original conflict has been addressed. 
(2) That the politics surrounding the management of natural resources is central 
to the establishment of long-term stability after a bitter civil conflict that had 
occurred partly because of natural-resource mismanagement. 
(3) That the identity conversations including gender have not be adequately 
addressed  
(4) That the externally driven peacebuilding process has not anchored the basis 
for stable peace  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
